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Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration
Agreements: Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.
I. Introduction
With the growth of international commerce,' arbitration has
surfaced as an attractive alternative to traditional litigation in the res-
olution of international commercial disputes. 2 The popularity of ar-
bitration can be attributed to its speed, flexibility, economy, and
neutrality. 3 Irrefutably, the current trend among U.S. courts is to
honor international commercial arbitration agreements, even with
respect to matters previously considered to be strictly within the ju-
risdiction of the courts. 4 The reticent impetus behind this trend has
been judicial concern for the development of international com-
I The United States Department of Commerce estimated the 1983 value of U.S. ex-
ports at $200.5 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. EXPORT AND IM-
PORT TRADE, FT990, Aug. 1984, at A-3, Table 1. In that same year, imports totaled
approximately $258 billion. Id. In 1972, by comparison, U.S. exports totaled only $49.8
billion, and imports totaled only $55.6 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 831 (1984).
2 Perlman, New Approaches to the Resolution ofInternational Commercial Disputes, 17 INT'L
LAw. 215, 225 (1983). Conventional litigation presents several problems in international
disputes: (1) because there are no internationally recognized jurisdictional rules, a given
dispute may fall within the jurisdiction of more than one country's courts, thus fostering
potential forum shopping; (2) the evidentiary and discovery rules vary from country to
country; and (3) U.S. courts do not automatically enforce foreign judgments, and vice
versa. Id. at 219-21.
3 See Bagner, Enforcement of International Commercial Contracts by Arbitration: Recent Devel-
opments, 14 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 573, 574 (1982) (benefits of arbitration include more
efficient use of time and money, greater adaptability to specific situations, more neutrality,
and more confidentiality); see also, Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE LJ. 1049,
1049 (1961) (advantages of arbitration include finality, speed, low cost, and flexibility).
But see de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts,
57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 61 (1982) (arguing that international arbitration lacks the speed, econ-
omy, and informality of domestic arbitration); Lempert, Companies Seeking Further Alterna-
tives to Litigation Abroad, Legal Times, Mar. 28, 1983, at 1, 8, col. 2 (asserting that
international arbitration can be lengthier and more costly than conventional litigation).
4 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (or-
dering arbitration of international antitrust claim); infra text accompanying notes 103-18;
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding arbitration of
international dispute involving bankruptcy); infra text accompanying note 100; Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (compelling arbitration
of federal securities claim based on arbitration clause of an international commercial
agreement); infra text accompanying notes 91-99.
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merce,5 coupled with a desire to ensure neutrality and predictability
in the resolution of international disputes. 6
In Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,7 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois continued this trend, or-
dering arbitration of breach of contract and tort claims arising from
an international shareholder dispute.8 This Note examines the legis-
lative and judicial trend toward enforcement of international arbitra-
tion agreements, as well as the rationale behind and the
consequences of the Marchetto decision. Part II provides a brief over-
view of the Marchetto facts and holding. Part III traces the legislative
development of international commercial arbitration in the United
States and highlights relevant case law which influenced the outcome
in Marchetto. Part IV thoroughly analyzes the Marchetto decision, its
ramifications, and alternatives which the district court failed to pur-
sue. Finally, this Note concludes that the Marchetto ruling is theoreti-
cally and logically sound, paying due respect to applicable legislative
developments and recent judicial mandates.
II. Overview of the Marchetto Facts and Decision
In Marchetto, the parties to the dispute were shareholders in
DeKalb Italiana, an Italian corporation formed in 1963 as ajoint ven-
ture between a U.S. corporation, DeKalb Agricultural, and two Ital-
ian citizens, the Marchetto Group. 9 When incorporated, DeKalb
Agricultural and the Marchetto Group each owned fifty percent of
the outstanding common stock. Their shareholder agreement pro-
vided a right of first refusal. This provision restricted the transfera-
bility of shares by requiring the consent of the remaining
shareholders and an opportunity for such shareholders to purchase
the stock. 10 Some time thereafter, the agreement was amended to
provide for resolution of shareholder disputes by a panel of arbitra-
tors in Rome, Italy. l '
5 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court announced:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged
if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 80-88.
6 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. The Court concluded, "[C]oncerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of dis-
putes require that we enforce the parties' agreement [to arbitrate]." Id.
7 711 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. I11. 1989).
8 Id. at 939.
9 Id. at 937. DeKaib Italiana engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
agricultural and vegetable products. Id.
10 Id.
II Id.
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After DeKalb Agricultural changed its name to DeKalb Corpora-
tion ("DeKalb"), it sold its shares in DeKalb Italiana to DeKalb-Pfi-
zer Genetics.' 2 DeKalb implemented such sale without the consent
of the Marchetto Group and without first offering the Marchetto
Group an opportunity to purchase the shares, thereby breaching the
contractual right of first refusal.13 In 1988, DeKalb reorganized into
three companies: DeKalb Energy (successor corporation to DeKalb),
DeKalb Genetics, and Pride Petroleum Services, Inc. 14
The Marchetto Group filed a complaint based on the unauthor-
ized sale of DeKalb Italiana stock and sought recovery arguing two
theories: (1) breach of contract, and (2) tortious interference with
the shareholder agreement. 15 Collectively named as defendants
were DeKalb Energy,' 6 DeKalb Genetics, 17 Pfizer Genetics,' 8 and
DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics.' 9 The defendants thereafter moved to dis-
miss the Marchetto complaint, insisting that the shareholder agree-
ment mandated arbitration of the dispute in Italy. 20
The court cited the recent legislative and judicial trend toward
enforcement of international arbitration agreements and ordered ar-
bitration of the dispute in Italy, notwithstanding the Marchetto's
contention that a unique Italian law would invalidate the arbitration
clause.2 1 Explaining that the validity of the arbitration agreement
must be determined by reference to U.S. law, the court concluded
that the possibility of nonenforcement by Italian arbitrators was not
dispositive of its duty to compel arbitration. 22 Because such ration-
ale applied to the tortious interference claim as well as the breach of
contract claim, the entire dispute was to be arbitrated in Italy, and
the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice. 23
12 DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics is a partnership formed between DeKalb Corp. and Pfizer
Genetics, Inc. Id. at 937-38.
13 Id. at 938.
14 Id. Moreover, DeKalb Genetics replaced DeKalb as a partner in DeKalb-Pfizer Ge-
netics. Id.
15 Id.
16 DeKalb Energy is the successor corporation to DeKalb Agricultural, the party with
whom the Marchettos initially entered into the shareholder agreement. Id. at 937-38.
17 DeKalb Genetics is one of the three companies which emerged from the DeKalb
reorganization in 1988. Id. at 938.
18 Pfizer Genetics is the party with whom DeKaib entered a partnership, thereby
forming DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics. Id. at 937-38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19 711 F. Supp. at 937-38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20 711 F. Supp. at 938. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction over
the subject matter, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). 711 F. Supp. at 938.
21 711 F. Supp. at 938-41. The Marchetto Group contended that a unique Italian law
would preclude enforcement of the arbitration agreement because three of the four de-
fendants were not parties to the arbitration agreement; i.e., DeKalb Energy, as successor
corporation to DeKalb Agricultural, was the only defendant actually a party to the share-
holder agreement.
22 Id. at 939.
23 Id. at 939-41.
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III. Historical Background of International Commercial Arbitration
Legislative developments in the United States have evinced the
growing popularity of arbitration as an'alternative form of dispute
resolution. In 1925, Congress promulgated the Federal Arbitration
Act, 24 thereby heralding the beginning of clear' congressional sup-
port for a national policy respecting arbitration agreements.25 Sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions have broadly construed the
Arbitration Act. 26
The Act provides that written agreements to arbitrate controver-
sies arising out of an existing contract "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. ' 27 Moreover, the Act enables a
party to petition a U.S. district court for an order compelling a defi-
ant party to proceed to arbitration,28 and it provides for the appoint-
ment of arbitrators29 and for the entry of an arbitral award. 30 It also
empowers courts to stay any litigation commenced in disregard of
the arbitration agreement. 3'
Despite past reluctance to join any multilateral treaty supporting
international arbitration,3 2 the United States ratified the United Na-
tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the Convention),33 in 1970, incorporating it as
24 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988) (formerly ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)) [hereinafter the
Act].
25 See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). The Act was designed to
allow parties to avoid "the costliness and delays of litigation" and to place arbitration
agreements "upon the same footing" as other freely negotiated contracts.
26 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22
n.27 (1983) (stating that the "policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of
arbitration agreements"). Former ChiefJustice Burger was an outspoken advocate of arbi-
tration. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982); Burger, Agenda
for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976).
27 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
28 The section provides in pertinent part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbi-
tration .... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, ne-
glect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.
Id. § 4.
29 Id. § 5.
30 Id. § 9.
31 Id. § 3 (mandating that courts stay proceedings when a written agreement for arbi-
tration exists and one of the parties has moved to stay the litigation pending arbitration).
32 See Comment, International Commercial Arbitration Under the United Nations Convention
and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441, 445 n.15 (1972). U.S.
reluctance was prompted by a general distrust of the multilateral treaty as a mechanism to
promote arbitration. Traditionally, the U.S. had preferred bilateral treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation (FCN treaties). Id.; see also Comment, Enforcing International
Commercial Arbitration Agreements-Post-Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
36 AM. U.L. REV. 57, 63 n.33 (1986) (listing several U.S. FCN treaties).
33 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
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Chapter Two of the Arbitration Act. 34 "The goal of the Convention
... was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commer-
cial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral
awards are enforced in the signatory countries."' 35 Accordingly, the
Convention regulates two aspects of the arbitral procedure: it deter-
mines whether an agreement is legally binding, and it enforces arbi-
tral awards.3 6
Among its most significant provisions, section 203 specifically
vests federal district courts with jurisdiction over arbitration falling
under the Convention.3 7 Moreover, pursuant to section 206, a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute may order
arbitration in the forum country.3 8 Courts have construed these pro-
visions liberally to the extent that any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration
agreements. 39
The framework for enforcement of arbitration agreements is set
out in Article II of the Convention. 40 Under Article 11(1), each con-
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
[hereinafter the Convention]. Although the U.S. did participate in the 1958 negotiations,
it did not accede to the Convention because its provisions were considered incompatible
with U.S. law. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3601, 3601-02. However, with the rapid expansion of U.S. trade
abroad, companies began including arbitration clauses in transnational contracts to pro-
tect themselves from the uncertainty of defending contract disputes in potentially hostile
foreign courts. See also Signatories to the 1970 New York Convention, 2 J. INT'L ARB. (No. 4)
120 (1985) (noting that 68 countries had acceded to the Convention as of Dec. 31, 1985).
34 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
35 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). See also Bergesen v.
Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that Convention was
intended to encourage recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards).
36 Note, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.: International Arbitration
and Antitrust Claims, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & B. 595, 598 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Mitsubishi].
See also Contini, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
ArbitralAwards, 8 AM. J. COMp. L. 283, 286 (1959).
37 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that ch. 2 is a congressional declaration of liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements despite conflicting state substantive or pro-
cedural policies).
38 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1988). See, e.g., Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Diakan Hope, S.A., 423 F.
Supp. 1220, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (arbitration ordered held in England in accordance
with valid arbitration agreement).
39 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
40 Article II of the Convention provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect to a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term 'agreement in writing' shall include an arbitral clause in a con-
tract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The Court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
tracting party must respect an agreement concerning a subject mat-
ter "capable of settlement by arbitration. '4 1 On the other hand,
Article 11(3) nullifies agreements which the courts determine to be
"null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed."'42
With respect to Article II(1), U.S. courts have not explicitly set
forth its meaning, but have instead ruled only on whether specific
arbitration agreements are enforceable. 43 However, with respect to
the "null and void" clause of Article 11(3), courts have stated that it
must be construed as encompassing only situations such as fraud,
mistake, duress, and waiver that can be applied neutrally on an inter-
national scale.44 Although it has been held that an agreement to ar-
bitrate may also be "null and void" if it contravenes fundamental
policies of the forum nation,45 an agreement is not invalid just be-
cause its provisions conflict with one party's national laws. 4 6 In
other words, the "parochial interests ... of any state ... cannot be
the measure of how the 'null and void' clause is interpreted." 47
Once a court has assessed the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment under the scrutiny of Article 11(1) and Article 11(3), finding
neither defense sufficient to negate the presumption favoring arbi-
tration, it must then stay any litigation and refer the parties to arbi-
tration.48 After an arbitral award is rendered, Article V of the
Convention provides several grounds on which a court may decline
enforcement of an arbitral award, including the defenses of inarbi-
trability and public policy.49
this article, [shall], at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.
Convention, supra note 33, art. II.
41 See id. Article II is intended to prevent courts from contravening the aims of the
Convention. It accomplishes this end by forbidding courts to refuse enforcement of an
arbitral award by simply concluding that the underlying arbitration agreement is invalid.
Note, Transnational Claims are Nonarbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act and Article II(1) of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 17 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 741, 747 n.33 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Transnational].
42 See Convention, supra note 33, art. II.
43 Note, Mitsubishi, supra note 36, at 599; see also Note, Transnational, supra note 41, at
746 n.30.
44 Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Transma-
rine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 480 F. Supp. 352, 358 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (holding that agreements exacted by duress contravene U.S. public policy, and that
duress is grounds for refusing enforcement under the Convention).
45 Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
46 Rhone Mediterranee Compagnie v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1983). See, e.g.,
Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (Italian seller's and Puerto Rican distributors' arbitration agree-
ment, providing for arbitration in Italy, was not "null and void" just because Puerto Rican
statute would nullify such provision).
47 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187.
48 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1988). See Note, International Arbitration and the Comity of Error: Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 19 CONN. L. REV. 435, 440 (1987) [herein-
after Note, International].
49 Article V provides seven defenses to recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
[VOL. 15
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There is necessarily somewhat of a conceptual overlap between
these Article V defenses and the Article II defenses discussed above.
For example, one of the provisions in Article V(1) provides that
"[riecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,.at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked ... if that party fur-
nishes ... proof that ... the said agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it.''50 However, Article II(1)
was specifically drafted to preclude such a result. A court cannot re-
fuse to recognize an arbitral award by simply finding that the under-
lying arbitration agreement was invalid.5 1 Moreover, Article V(2) of
the Convention allows a court to refuse enforcement of an arbitral
award either if the subject matter of the difference is not proper for
arbitration, or if recognizing the award would be contrary to the pub-
lic policy of that country. 52
Although the public policy exception relates exclusively to the
enforcement of arbitral awards, 53 there is great overlap with respect
to the sweep of the inarbitrability defense. Under Article II(1), such
defense may be invoked to assess the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment, and under Article V(2)(a), it can be invoked to assess the valid-
ity of an arbitral award. 54 Nonetheless, U.S. courts have narrowly
construed all of these available defenses in order to effectuate the
Convention's primary purpose of encouraging recognition and en-
forcement of international commercial arbitration agreements. 55
award: incapacity; improper notice; an award not conforming with the subject matter of
the submission; improper composition of the arbitral panel; lack of finality; subject matter
not capable of settlement by arbitration; and public policy. Convention, supra note 33, art.
V. See generally, Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAw. 269 (1979).
50 Convention, supra note 33, art. V(1)(a).
51 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
52 Article V(2) of the Convention provides in pertinent part:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recogni-
tion or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country.
Convention, supra note 33, art. V(2)(a)-(b).
53 Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of
Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 270 (1986). See also Note, International, supra
note 48, at 439 n. 17 (explaining that the "public policy" defense under art. V is available
only after an award has been rendered).
54 Carbonneau, supra note 53, at 270.
55 See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie Du Papier (Rakta), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), holding the Article V "public
policy" defense can succeed only if the award violates the forum state's "most basic no-
tions of morality and justice." Id. at 974. In fact, one commentator has noted that the
"public policy" defense has succeeded only three times in approximately one hundred
cases. Sanders, supra note 49, at 271.
With respect to the narrow construction of Article 11(3), see supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text. This narrow construction has prevailed, whether a party seeks to void
the agreement itself under Article II, or prevent enforcement of an arbitral award under
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
For example, in Matter of Ferrara, S.P.A.,56 Italian buyers of
wheat brought an action against the Canadian seller seeking to stay
arbitration of the seller's claim for breach of contract. 5 7 Essentially,
the buyers resisted arbitration based on a unique Italian rule of law
providing that arbitration agreements are unenforceable unless they
appear above the signatures of both parties.58 In the wheat contract,
the arbitration clause appeared on the back of a one-page standard
form contract, whereas the parties' signatures appeared on the front
of the form, just above the legend. 5 9
Citing the "general rule that a person of ordinary understanding
and competence is bound by the provisions of a contract he signs
whether or not he has read them," the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York upheld the validity of the arbi-
tration agreement.60 The court found the unique Italian provision
inapposite and noted that federal courts have consistently refused to
recognize special foreign requirements governing agreements to
arbitrate. 6'
In Rhone Mediterranee Compagnie v. Lauro,6 2 the plaintiff-insurer
filed suit to recover payments 'Made to the owner of a time charter
vessel that burned while docked.63 The owner-defendant thereafter
filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on an arbitration agreement
in the parties' contract. Rhone, in response, contended that the arbi-
tration agreement must be disregarded as null and void under Italian
law, pursuant to which arbitration is valid only if conducted by an
odd number of arbitrators. 64 The contract in Rhone provided for a
panel of two arbitrators supplemented with a tiebreaking process if
there was not unanimity. 65 Nonetheless, Rhone insisted that when
an arbitration clause refers to a place of arbitration (e.g., Italy), the
law of that place was dispositive as to the "null and void" inquiry of
Article II(3).66
Article V, primarily because policy-driven concern for fostering international arbitration is
the same in each case. See Note, International, supra note 48, at 440 n.17.
56 Matter of Ferrara, S.P.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Ferrara, S.P.A. v. United Grain Growers, Ltd., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
57 441 F. Supp. at 779.
58 Id. at 780.
59 Id. at 779. The legend conspicuously stated, "(SEE CONDITIONS AND RULES
ON OTHER SIDE)." Id.
60 Id. at 781.
61 Id. Quoting the Supreme Court's decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at
520 n.15, the court noted that signatory countries to the Convention " 'should not be
permitted to decline enforcement of such [arbitration] agreements on the basis of paro-
chial views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding
nature of the agreements.' " 441 F. Supp. at 781.
62 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983).
63 Id. at 51.
64 Id. at 52-53.
65 Id. at 52.
66 Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit con-
ceded the latent ambiguity of Article 11(3) by virtue of the provision's
failure to specify what law determines whether an agreement is "null
and void."'6 7 However, by looking to section 203 of the Convention,
the court concluded that actions arising under the Convention
thereby arise under U.S. law.68 As a consequence thereof, it found
that the validity of the arbitration clause should be measured against
the fundamental policies of the Convention, which include promot-
ing the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 69 Consequently,
because the Italian rule as to the number of arbitrators did not impli-
cate the Convention's fundamental concerns, the arbitration agree-
ment was valid and Rhone's suit was stayed pending arbitration. 70
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reached
a similar conclusion in Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno,7 1 thereby establish-
ing the test by which international arbitration agreements are evalu-
ated under the Convention. In 1964, an Italian manufacturer of
ceramic tiles entered a distributorship agreement by which it granted
two Puerto Rican corporations and a private individual the exclusive
right to sell and distribute its tiles in the Antilles. 72 The contract was
later reduced to writing and provided for arbitration of all disputes
arising thereunder. 73 Despite the arbitration clause, the Puerto Ri-
cans filed a complaint in 1981, alleging that the manufacturer had
unjustifiably terminated the distributorship. 74 After the district
court dismissed the complaint and ordered arbitration, the plaintiffs
appealed, insisting that the arbitration agreement had been nullified
by a unique Puerto Rican law which purported to override the Con-
vention's mandate favoring arbitration. 75
The First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contentions. The court
announced that the Convention requires a four-pronged inquiry,
namely, (1) whether there is a written arbitration agreement; (2)
whether the agreement provides for arbitration in a signatory coun-
try; (3) whether the agreement arises out of a commercial legal rela-
tionship; and (4) whether the commercial transaction has a
reasonable relationship to a foreign state. 76 If all questions are an-
swered affirmatively, the court's discretion is removed and it must
67 Id. Commentators have suggested that Article II(3)'s ambiguity opened the door
for forum states to look to their own rules regarding conflicts of laws. See, e.g., Quigley,
supra note 3, at 1064 (contending that sec. 3 permitg examination of forum law and policy).
68 712 F.2d at 54.
69 Id. at 53-54.
70 Id. at 54-55.
71 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982).
72 Id. at 185.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 186.
76 Id. at 186-87.
1990]
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order arbitration unless the agreement is "null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed. ' 77 Because the distributorship
agreement in question did satisfy the four-pronged test, the arbitra-
tion order was affirmed, notwithstanding the Puerto Rican statute
which purportedly invalidated the agreement.
Expounding on its result, the court noted that the parochial in-
terests of a particular state such as Puerto Rico cannot be the mea-
sure of interpreting the Convention's "null and void" clause.78
Rather, all defenses must be construed narrowly in order to effectu-
ate the intent of the Convention. Consequently, "null and void" en-
compasses "only those situations-such as fraud, mistake, duress,
and waiver-that can be applied neutrally on an international
scale." 79
The U.S. ratification of the Convention in 1970 was soon fol-
lowed by an unprecedented judicial movement recognizing the valid-
ity of international choice-of-forum agreements. In The Bremen .v
Zapata Off-Shore Co. ,80 a German corporation had contracted to tow a
drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy. Even though the parties and the
transaction had no connection with England, they had agreed to liti-
gate all disputes in London. 8' Moreover, the contract contained two
clauses purporting to exculpate the German firm from liability for
any harm to the rig.82 Subsequently, a heavy storm damaged the rig
while en route to Italy. 83
The choice-of-forum clause was crucial because English courts
would almost certainly recognize the exculpatory clauses. 84 On the
other hand, U.S. admiralty courts usually denied enforcement of ex-
culpatory clauses, considering them contrary to public policy. 85 Ac-
cordingly, the U.S. rig-owner ignored the choice-of-forum clause and
commenced suit in a U.S. district court.86 Although the lower courts
had found the U.S. forum more appropriate, the Supreme Court re-
versed, noting that when parties to an international transaction have
contractually designated a forum, such clause should be enforced
unless it was the product of fraud or unequal bargaining power to
the extent that its enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.8 7
Moreover, the Court's solicitude for the forum-selection clause was
prompted by its policy favoring expanded international trade, which
77 Id. at 187 (quoting Convention, supra note 33, art. 11(3)).
78 Id.
79 Id. (citing I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981)).
80 407 U.S. I (1972).
81 Id. at 2.
82 Id. at 3.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 8.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 3-4.
87 Id. at 15.
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would "hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts,
we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts."88
Judicial endorsement of choice-of-forum clauses has evinced it-
self in the current trend among U.S. courts honoring international
commercial arbitration agreements. In fact, international arbitration
has even been extended to matters such as securities disputes, which
had previously been considered strictly within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
Ever since the Supreme Court decision Wilko v. Swan,89 a case
arising under the Securities Act of 1933, it had been held that securi-
ties disputes were not appropriate for arbitration. 90 However, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,91 which arose under the Securities Act of
1934, the Supreme Court found Wilko inapposite. Scherk not only fell
under a different statutory framework, but also, the circumstances of
Scherk arose from a truly international context.92
Alberto-Culver, a U.S. firm, and Scherk, a German citizen, had
signed a sales contract for the transfer of Scherk's ownership in cer-
tain European cosmetics companies, including all of his trade-
marks. 93 The agreement contained a clause providing for arbitration
of any disputes in Paris. 94 Soon thereafter, alleging that Scherk had
made fraudulent misrepresentations as to the trademarks, Alberto-
Culver filed suit in a federal district court in Illinois.95 In response,
Scherk sought to stay the proceedings in accordance with the con-
tract's arbitration clause. 96
The Court distinguished its Wilko holding from Scherk by noting
that Scherk involved a "truly international" contract subject to com-
peting considerations of international cooperation and trade.97 The
Court further explained that because arbitration promotes orderli-
ness and predictability in dispute resolution, such clauses are "al-
most indispensable" in international contracts.98 Consequently, the
Court ordered enforcement of the arbitration agreement, giving rise
to the theory that disputes not ordinarily arbitrable under domestic
law may be subject to arbitration at the international level.99
88 Id. at 9.
89 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
90 Note, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the United Nations Convention of
1958: A Survey of Recent Federal Case Law, 11 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 13, 37 (1987).
91 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
92 417 U.S. at 515.
93 Id. at 508.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 509.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 515. The Court emphasized that Wilko involved only U.S. domestic concerns.
Id.
98 Id. at 516.
99 Id. at 519-20. Citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 9 (1972),
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The trend favoring arbitration has recently been extended to in-
ternational disputes involving bankruptcy, 100 intellectual prop-
erty, 10 ' RICO claims, 10 2  and most controversially, antitrust
claims. 103 Until the Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 10 4 U.S. courts had uniformly embraced
the American Safety doctrine, pursuant to which antitrust disputes
were considered within the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial sys-
tem. 10 5 In 1979, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican corpora-
tion, entered a distribution agreement with Chrysler International,
S.A., a Swiss corporation owned by the American Chrysler Corpora-
tion.10 6 Soler simultaneously entered a sales agreement with
Chrysler International and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a joint
Japanese-U.S. venture, by which Soler was to distribute Mitsubishi
vehicles as an agent for Chrysler. 10 7 Soon thereafter, disputes arose
over sales commitments and Mitsubishi sought certain storage costs
from Soler. 10 8 Because the parties had agreed to arbitrate all dis-
putes,' 0 9 Mitsubishi brought suit to compel arbitration under the Ar-
bitration Act and the Convention. 110 In turn, Soler denied the
allegations and counterclaimed alleging antitrust violations."'I
Despite years of adherence to the American Safety doctrine by
higher federal courts, the district court ordered arbitration of the an-
titrust claims.' 12 The First Circuit reversed in favor of retaining the
American Safety rule," t3 but the Supreme Court criticized this tradi-
tional view. The Court held that such antitrust disputes are arbitra-
ble despite the complexity and importance of such disputes.' "4
the Court concluded: "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
417 U.S. at 519-20.
100 Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
101 U.S. law was recently amended to allow arbitration of patent disputes. 35 U.S.C.
§ 294 (1982).
102 Development Bank of the Phillipines v. Chemtex Fibers Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). There is currently a split among courts as to the arbitrability of RICO
claims. See West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. Wash. 1985)
(concurring with Chemtex); but see McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1986); Webb v. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (both
holding RICO claims inarbitrable).
103 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
104 Id.
105 This characterization of federal antitrust law was derived from the Second Circuit's
decision in American Safety Equip. Corp. v, J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968).
106 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616.
107 Id. at 617.
108 Id. at 618 n.2.
109 Id. at 617.
11 I Id. at 618-19.
I Id. at 619-20.
112 Id. at 620-21.
113 Id. at 623.
114 Id. at 632-36.
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With respect to antitrust complexities, the Court noted that the
flexibility of arbitration provided for a panel of experts, maximizing
the chances of a competent solution.' 15 With regard to the signifi-
cance and impact of antitrust suits, the Court recognized that judicial
review of arbitral decisions is provided for at the enforcement
stage. 1 6 The premise of the Court's decision was that the future
expansion of U.S. business abroad would suffer if the United States
insisted on resolving all disputes in U.S. courts pursuant to U.S.
laws."17 In essence, the Court recapitulated its conviction that fed-
eral policies favoring arbitration apply with special force in the con-
text of international commerce." 18
IV. Analysis of the Marchetto Decision
Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. 119 is the latest in the trend of
U.S. courts toward a more liberal policy favoring arbitration. The
district court's decision in Marchetto, enforcing the arbitration provi-
sion of an international shareholder contract, comports with
Supreme Court mandates announced in Mitsubishi 120 and its precur-
sors. 1 2 1 In Marchetto, the court recognized that the strong "federal
policy favoring arbitration applies with special force in the area of
international commerce."1 22 Moreover, it explained that arbitration
is mandatory if a commercial agreement having a reasonable rela-
tionship to a foreign state provides in writing that all disputes shall
be arbitrated in a signatory country. 123 In other words, when such
conditions exist, the court must compel arbitration, thereby honor-
ing the Convention's purposes of encouraging arbitration of interna-
tional commercial disputes and unifying standards of enforcing such
115 Id. at 634.
116 Id. at 638 (citing Convention, supra note 33, art. V(2)(b)).
117 Id. at 629. The Court relied heavily on the "parochial" concept first espoused in
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,9 (1972). See supra note 88 and accompa-
nying text.
Moreover, the Court pledged allegiance to its holding in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), by concluding that:
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international com-
mercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we
enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in the domestic context.
473 U.S. at 629.
118 473 U.S. at 631.
119 711 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
120 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See
supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
121 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I (1972), discussed supra notes 80-
88 and accompanying text; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), discussed
supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
122 Marchetto, 711 F. Supp. at 938 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629-31, and Scherk, 417
U.S. at 516-17).
123 Id. at 939.
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agreements. 1 24
After the compelling mandate of Mitsubishi, the Illinois district
court was stringently obligated to order arbitration of the share-
holder dispute in Marchetto. Given the primacy which the United
States attaches to the antitrust laws which regulate its free market
economy, some commentators have insisted that the Mitsubishi con-
flict was a rare example in which arbitration should have been pre-
cluded. 125  After all, antitrust issues are so complex that
comprehensive discovery procedures unavailable in arbitration are
often indispensable. 126 Judicial trial provides for such procedures,
as well as detailed fact finding, both of which may be crucial on re-
view. 127 Perhaps most significantly, when an antitrust claim is prose-
cuted, the breadth of the decision goes far beyond the parties to the
case, thereby having considerable impact on the general public.' 28
Notwithstanding these weighty considerations, antitrust regulation
was deemed arbitrable in Mitsubishi.129
Marchetto, by comparison, involved a simple breach of contract
allegation which gave rise to a companion claim for tortious interfer-
ence with the contract. The issues were not complex, comprehensive
discovery was not necessary, and the scope of the decision would not
extend much beyond the parties to the suit. Even the dissent in Mit-
subishi acknowledged that arbitration is well suited for the resolution
of simple contractual disputes.' 30
Nonetheless, the Marchettos insisted that their arbitration
agreement was incapable of performance pursuant to an Italian law
which would not recognize the clause because three of the four de-
fendants were not parties to the agreement.' 3 ' They invoked Article
11(3) of the Convention to support their contention. 3 2 They also
argued that their tortious interference claim was beyond the scope of
the agreement. ' 3 3
As explained previously, an agreement is not invalid under Arti-
cle 11(3) just because its provisions conflict with one party's national
laws.' 3 4 The validity of an arbitration agreement is not determined
124 Id. at 938.
125 Note, Mitsubishi, supra note 36, at 613-14.
126 Id. at 613.
127 Id. at 613-14.
128 Id. at 614..
129 Id.
IO Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 648-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Marchetto, 711 F. Supp. at 939. Defendants disputed this contention, alleging the
Italian courts, out of respect for the Convention, would vest Italian arbitrators with juris-
diction over all of the defendants. Id. at 940.
132 Id. at 939.
'33 Id.
*134 See, e.g., Matter of Ferrara, S.P.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Ferrara, S.P.A. v. United Grain Growers, Ltd., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), dis-
cussed supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text; Rhone Mediterranee Compagnie v.
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by the law of the place of arbitration.13 5 Rather, actions arising
under the Convention are deemed to have arisen under U.S. law,136
and it is assumed "that signatory nations to the Convention will
honor arbitration agreements and reject challenges to arbitration
based on legal principles unique to the signatory nation."13 7 Pursu-
ant to U.S. law, even the three defendant-nonparties to the agree-
ment could participate in the Marchetto arbitration proceedings.' 38
Moreover, because the arbitration clause provided for the resolution
of all disputes arising out of the contract, and the scope of arbi-
trability is itself a question for arbitration, the court had no authority
to sever the Marchettos' tort claim. l39
The Marchetto decision has perpetuated the trend of honoring
international commercial arbitration agreements. The desirability of
such an approach has been well-documented. International trade is
encouraged when U.S. and foreign corporations are assured that
their freely formed contract provisions will be respected in U.S.
courts. Also, neutrality and predictability in the resolution of inter-
national disputes is best achieved when defenses to arbitrability are
construed narrowly. If, as the Marchetto court assumed, Italy honors
the parties' arbitration agreement, the plaintiffs will be able to arbi-
trate their complaints against all four defendants. 140 This avoids the
undesirable consequence of several piecemeal adjudications.
However, Italy may choose not to honor the arbitration agree-
ment, and the Marchettos may be allowed to arbitrate only against
DeKalb Energy, the one party actually bound to arbitrate by virtue of
succession to the obligations of DeKalb Agricultural. If DeKalb Ge-
netics, Pfizer Genetics, and DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics are not made
parties to the Italian arbitration, unique problems may arise. For ex-
ample, if the arbitrator renders a decision in favor of the Marchettos,
DeKalb Energy may be unable to satisfy the judgment on its own.
Some scholars, in assessing the .efficiency of arbitration, have noted
that "there is no third-party procedure pursuant to which a party
Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983), discussed supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text; see
also, Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982), discussed supra notes 71-79
and accompanying text.
135 Marchetto, 711 F. Supp. at 940.
136 Id. at 939 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988)).
137 Id. at 940.
138 Id. at 939 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 20 (1983)). Relying on Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989), the Marchettos asserted that even
under U.S. law, arbitration is not permissible when claims are asserted against entities that
were not formal parties to the agreement. 711 F. Supp. at 940. However, the Volt contract
had specifically incorporated California rules of arbitration. Thus, the Volt holding simply
lent credence to the. principle that contracts should be enforced according to the terms
agreed upon by the parties. Conseqently, the Marchettos' contention was rejected. Id.
139 Id. at 939-40 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25).
140 Id.
1990]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
might bring into the arbitration proceedings someone who is not a
party to the arbitration agreement but who may be liable ultimately
in whole or in part for the award."'' 4 1
These problems are not without a solution. Despite the Con-
vention's mandates favoring arbitration, nothing precludes parties
from bringing suit against third parties not bound by the arbitration
agreement. For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 142 Soler was compelled to arbitrate its antitrust allegation
against Mitsubishi.' 43 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court noted that
Soler was still free to file an antitrust suit against Chrysler Interna-
tional, an involved third party who was not actually bound by the
arbitration agreement. 144 In Marchetto, the plaintiffs' actions in fed-
eral district court were dismissed without prejudice because the dis-
putes were arbitrable. 145 If the Italian arbitrators dispose only of the
Marchettos' claims against DeKalb Energy, presumably, the plaintiffs
could still file an amended complaint against the other three
defendants.
Perhaps a better resolution would have been simply to stay the
plaintiffs' district court proceedings pending the outcome of the Ital-
ian arbitration. The district court could even have attached condi-
tions to the stay order, including language to the effect that if the
defendant DeKalb Energy is unable to satisfy a judgment in the
plaintiffs' favor, the plaintiffs' action against the other three defend-
ants would still be pending. 146 This would have the desirable conse-
quence of assuring the Marchettos a forum for resolving all of their
complaints. Moreover, such an approach would comport with the
Supreme Court's views announced in Mitsubishi, whereby U.S. courts
have an opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that
all legitimate interests of the parties have been addressed. 147
Viewed in light of recent legislative and judicial developments,
the Marchetto ruling is both theoretically and logically sound. How-
ever, its likely overall impact in the world of international commer-
cial arbitration will be minimal. It is not a ground breaking decision
which represents an extreme deviation from past case law precedent.
Rather, Marchetto simply represents a logical extension of the con-
141 Yates, Arbitration or Court Litigation for Private International Dispute Resolution: The Lesser
of Two Evils, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION 224, 229 (Carbonneau 6th ed. 1982).
142 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
14" 473 U.S. at 632-36.
144 Id. at 620 n.7.
145 Marchetto, 711 F. Supp. at 941.
146 See, e.g., Builders Fed. Ltd. v. Turner Constr., 655 F. Supp. 1400, 1408 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (in action arising under Convention, district court's order of conditional stay pend-
ing results of a foreign arbitration in effect bound third parties who were not otherwise
legally bound by the arbitration agreement).
147 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
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cepts espoused by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi and its precur-
sors. 4 8 As noted by the dissent in Mitsubishi, simple contractual
disputes like Marchetto are generally well suited for arbitration.'
49
Relatively speaking, Marchetto is not a complex case. It would be dif-
ficult to genuinely contend that the district court's arbitration order
was not proper. The real danger lurks in the more complicated areas
of law like antitrust and securities litigation. Granted, policy consid-
erations have prompted the Supreme Court to adopt an approach
that would deem nearly all such disputes arbitrable. However, this
approach is not without its critics, 150 and cases like Marchetto should
not be construed as indicating that arbitration is always the optimal
dispute resolution alternative.
V. Conclusion
In summary, Marchetto is the latest characterization of the trend
among U.S. courts toward honoring freely formed international
commercial arbitration agreements. Given the force and breadth of
the Supreme Court's 1985 Mitsubishi decision, the Marchetto court
passively acquiesced to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration
of international commercial disputes. Based on sound reasoning
and logic, the decision pays due respect to the legislative and judicial
developments of the past two decades. However, the court did not
adequately address the legitimate rights of the Marchettos. It simply
assumed that Italy, as a signatory to the Convention, would ignore its
local rules which forbid the joinder of nonparties to an arbitration
agreement. If the Marchetto court had ordered a conditional stay of
the proceedings, instead of simply granting a dismissal, it would have
evinced a greater respect for the need to protect the legitimate inter-
ests of all parties bound by international commercial arbitration
agreements.
GREGORY J. HARE
148 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
149 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Note, Mitsubishi, supra note 36, at 613-17; Note, International, supra note 48,
at 456-66.
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